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APPENDIX A: DATA
ESTIMATION IS BASED ON ALL 18 yearly waves of the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), covering the period from 1991 to 2008.1 Apart from those
who are lost through attrition, all families in the original 1991 sample and sub-
sequent booster samples remain in the panel from then onwards. Other in-
dividuals have been added to the sample in subsequent periods—sometimes
temporarily—as they formed families with original interviewees or were born
to them. All members of the household aged 16 and above are interviewed.
We select the sample of women in all types of family arrangement observed
while aged 19 to 50. Our full data set is an unbalanced panel of 3,901 women
observed for some varying period during the years 1991 to 2008. Almost 60%
of these women were observed for at least 5 years and just over 20% were
observed for at least 10 years; 25% are observed entering working life from
education, and for 18% parental earnings when the respondent was aged 16–17
is observed. A great deal of information is collected for them, including family
demographics, employment, working hours and earnings as well as those of a
present partner, women’s demographics such as age and education, demand
for childcare and its cost. Moreover, historical data provide information on
the characteristics of their parental home when they were aged 16, including
whether lived with parents, parent’s education, employment status, number of
siblings and sibling order, books at home.
Some definitional and data preparation procedures should be mentioned
for clarity. Employment is determined by present labor-market status and ex-
cludes self-employment. The paths of women who report being self-employed
are deleted from that moment onwards. Only women working 5 or more hours
per week are classified as employed. We consider employment choices from
the age of 19 for women with secondary and high school education, and from
the age of 22 for women with university education.
Working hours refer to the usual hours in main job including overtime. We
discretized labor supply using a three-point distribution: not working (0 to 4
hours per week, modeled as 0 hours), working part-time (5 to 20 hours per
week, modeled as 18 hours), and working full-time (21 hours or more per week,
1University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2010). British Household
Panel Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2008. [data collection]. 7th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 5151,
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5151-1.
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modeled as 38 hours). The employment status and working hours observed at
one point in the year are assumed to remain unaltered over the entire year.
Earnings are the usual gross weekly earnings in the main job. (Hourly) wage
rates are the ratio of weekly earnings to weekly hours capped at 70. The wage
distribution is trimmed at percentiles 2 and 99 from below and above, respec-
tively, and only for women working at or above 5 hours per week to reduce the
severity of measurement error in wage rates.
Wage rates are detrended using the aggregate wage index (for both men
and women of all education levels), and all other monetary parameters in the
model, including all monetary values in the annual sequence of tax and bene-
fit systems, were deflated using the same index. To construct this index, we run
three regressions, one for each education level, of trimmed wages on time dum-
mies and dummies of Scotland and Wales. We create three education-specific
wage indices from the coefficients in time. Then we aggregate these indices
using the distribution of education for the entire population of workers aged
25–59 in the sample. This is the wage index we use. Any real monetary values
(using the CPI) are then rescaled using this index.
Family type includes four groups: single women and couples without children,
lone mothers, and couples with children. Women are assumed to have children
only after finishing education, once entering the labor market. Cumulated work
experience is measured in years. Individual assets at the beginning of adult life
are the total of savings and investments net of debts. They are truncated at
zero, never allowed to be negative. Education is classified in three categories:
secondary or compulsory (completed by the age of 16), high school or equiv-
alent (corresponding to A-levels or equivalent qualifications), and university
(3-year degrees and above).
APPENDIX B: PARAMETERS ESTIMATED OUTSIDE
THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
Externally Set Parameters
Two parameters are chosen from pre-existing estimates: the coefficient, μ,
set to −056, giving a risk-aversion coefficient of 1.56 (consistent with evidence
in Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1995)).
This choice implies that the utility is always negative, and so the higher is the
argument in the exponential—U in equation (1)—the lower is overall utility.
Hence, positive and larger values of the parameters in U make working less
attractive. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.98, a typical value in the literature
(see, e.g., Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)). Moreover, the risk-
free interest rate is set to 0.015, which is slightly lower than the discount rate,
thus implying that agents have some degree of impatience. Tuition costs of uni-
versity education amount to £3,000 (uprated to 2008 prices) for the three-year
program and the credit limit for university students (and graduates throughout
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their life) is £5,000 (also uprated to 2008 prices), both reflecting the univer-
sity education policy of the late 1990s in the U.K. For everyone else, credit is
constrained.
Family Transitions
Family transition probabilities were estimated using linear probability re-
gressions, weighted to ensure an equal number of women at each age.
The probability of a partner arriving is estimated by regressing a dummy
for partner arrival on a fourth-order polynomial in female age among single
women aged 55 or less. This is done separately for each of the nine combina-
tions of female and partner education level. Arrival probabilities in the first
period of working life are taken directly from the data, and are set to zero af-
ter 55. The probability of a partner leaving is also described by a fourth-order
polynomial in female age, estimated on all women aged 20–69. This is done
separately by spouses’ education and presence of children.
The probability of a child arriving is estimated by regressing a dummy for
child arrival on a second-order polynomial in female age and, for families with
children, a second-order polynomial in age of next youngest child and a linear
interaction with female age. This is done separately for each female education
level and by couple status. The probability of a child arriving is set to zero from
when the woman reaches 43 onwards.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of family composition by female age and
education for both observed data and model simulations. The displayed simu-
lated profiles are reasonably close to the observed data ones. They show that
secondary-educated women are more likely to become mothers early on and
to experience lone-motherhood than high school and university graduates.
Male Employment and Earnings
Table XIX reports the estimates for male working status and earnings by
his education. This is relevant only for women in couples, as we do not seek
to solve the men’s problem. However, the partner’s employment and income
changes the family budget constraint and the work incentives of women in cou-
ples.
Rows 1 to 3 display estimates from a probit regression and show that the
employment probability generally increases with education and is very persis-
tent (row 3). Estimates for the log wage equation suggest only mild differences
in wage rates by education (row 4) but strong differences in wage progres-
sion, with more educated men experiencing steeper wage profiles over time
(row 5). We set the autocorrelation coefficient in the male productivity pro-
cess to 0.99, close to a unit root. Having tried several alternative exclusion re-
strictions within a Heckman (1979) selection model of male employment and
earnings, we found no evidence of statistically significant selection. Hence, we
4 BLUNDELL, COSTA DIAS, MEGHIR, AND SHAW
FIGURE 11.—Family demographics by female age—data and simulations. Notes: Distribution
of family types by age of woman. Data in solid lines, simulations in dashed lines.
assume that the residuals in the employment and wage equations are uncorre-
lated.
Families with positive childcare costs pay £2.60 (standard error 0.04) per
working hour. Childcare is required for every hour when all adults in the house-
hold are working if the child is 5 or younger, and is only necessary for older
children under the age of 10 if all adults work full-time.
APPENDIX C: COMPUTATIONAL DETAILS ON THE SOLUTION AND
ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
The estimation and simulation exercises require the solution of the female
life-cycle model. Since there is no analytical solution to the problem, we ap-
proximate numerically the policy functions for labor supply, consumption, and
education choices conditionally on the woman’s information at each period of
her life (the state variables, described by X at the start of Section 4.2). We do
this by backward recursion, starting from the end of life (age 70).
A key feature of our model is that it models the joint consumption and la-
bor supply decisions over the working years of women, where the former is a
continuous choice while the latter is discrete. The numerical solution of prob-
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TABLE XIX
EXOGENOUS PARAMETERS: MARRIED MEN EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE RATES BY EDUCATIONa
Man’s Education
Secondary Further Higher
Employment probabilities
(1) New couples 0.74 0.87 0.83
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(2) Ongoing couples: intercept 0.05 0.37 0.58
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
(3) Ongoing couples: previously employed 1.52 1.40 1.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Log wage equation
(4) Log wage rates 1.94 2.07 2.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.15)
(5) Log woman’s age minus 18 0.09 0.18 0.35
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
(6) St. deviation of innovation to productivity 0.37 0.36 0.39
(new couples) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18)
(7) St. deviation of innovation to productivity 0.12 0.10 0.10
(ongoing couples) (0.04) (0.03) (0.5)
aStandard errors in parentheses below the estimate. Sample sizes are: 665 observations for new couples, 31,946
observations for all couples, and 16,318 for continuously employed men.
lems with simultaneous discrete and continuous choices is considerably harder
than that of problems with only continuous or only discrete choices, explain-
ing the limited existing work on such models. Some studies (e.g., French and
Jones (2011), Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2015)) have opted for discretiz-
ing the space of the continuous choice. More recently, solution methods to
handle discrete and continuous choices have been proposed by Fella (2014)
and Iskhakov, Jorgensen, Rust, and Schjerning (2015). Our solution method
is close but not identical to the methods advanced by these two papers, and
hence we describe it here.
The main difficulty in solving dynamic problems that combine discrete and
continuous choices is that the smoothness and concavity of the value func-
tion that is typical of continuous problems—and that ensures the existence
and uniqueness of a solution that is itself continuous and, if interior, is the root
of the optimality condition (Euler equation)—does not hold in a problem with
a discrete choice variable. The addition of a discrete choice makes the value
function piecewise concave, with kinks falling at the points where the agent
is indifferent between any two possible alternatives along the discrete choice
domain; these then translate into discontinuities in the optimal choice of the
continuous variable (consumption or savings).
6 BLUNDELL, COSTA DIAS, MEGHIR, AND SHAW
Kinks created by present choices at time t—what Iskhakov et al. (2015)
called primary kinks—do not pose difficulties. They can be dealt with by condi-
tioning the continuous choice on the discrete choice in a first step, followed by
the choice of the alternative with highest value in the second step. This is com-
putationally more demanding than the purely continuous problem because the
root of the Euler equation must be calculated for each point in the domain of
the discrete choice, but the solution method is a trivial extension of that for a
purely continuous problem.
However, kinks propagate backwards through the (expected) continuation
values—the secondary kinks. These are caused by indifference points in future
choices, from t + 1 onwards, and hence cannot be easily conditioned on. The
further back one moves, the more kinks there will be. Furthermore, associated
with secondary kinks are discontinuities in future choices, which need to be
accounted for in the Euler equation, as they affect the marginal utility of the
continuous choice variable at both time t and t + 1. This implies that the Euler
equation is no longer a sufficient optimality condition, even after conditioning
on the discrete choice at time t.
As noticed by Iskhakov et al. (2015) and others before them (e.g., Gomes,
Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001)), kinks can be eliminated and the expected
continuation value can be “concavified” by uncertainty. This is the approach
we explore given the rich characterization of uncertainty we account for in the
model.
In our problem, the kinks in the value function occur at the level of assets
where the woman is indifferent between working full-time/part-time/not work-
ing, or at points in assets that lead optimally to indifference points in the future
(all conditional on her present state). To see why, consider the value function
for a given woman at working-life age t facing state Xt . Her value function is
Vt(Xt)= max
lt∈L(Xt )
{
Vt(Xt |lt = O)Vt(Xt |lt = P)Vt(Xt |lt = F)
}
(14)
where
Vt(Xt |lt = l)= max
ct∈C(Xt l)
{
u(ct l;Xt)+βE
[
Vt+1(Xt+1)|Xt l
]}
(15)
L(X) represents the feasibility space for labor supply l given X and C(X l) is
the feasibility space for consumption c given (X l). In the above expression,
the expectation in the continuation value is taken with respect to the transition
probability in a subset of variables in X: the woman’s productivity shock (υ),
the arrival of a new child (tk changing to zero), the formation or dissolution of
a marriage (m), the education of a new spouse (s˜), and the employment and
productivity of a present spouse (l˜ υ˜).
We are concerned with kinks in EVt+1. Clearly, for as long as the transition
function for (υ tkm s˜ l˜ υ˜) is non-degenerate and the kinks at t+1 vary with
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FIGURE 12.—Expected value functions; by age, family demographics, and assets. Notes: Lines
are numerical approximations of the value functions at selected age and family demographics by
assets. Plots are for women of type I in utility cost of work, low background factors 1 and 2, with
compulsory education only and at their average productivity level, the age of the youngest child
is 10 for mothers, and the spouses of women in couples have completed compulsory education
only and are working at their average productivity.
these variables, their presence will dilute the kinks in EVt+1. Whether it is suf-
ficient to “concavify” the expected value function is a practical question. Using
a fine grid of 50 points in assets, we inspect the concavity of our numerical ap-
proximation of the expected value function. This is a finer grid than we use to
solve and estimate the model; it is used here with the purpose of finding non-
concavities that could have been missed with a coarser grid. Figure 12 shows
some examples of the profile of the expected value functions for different age
groups. We have exhaustively inspected the value function at other points in
the state space based both on the finer grid in assets used here and the coarser
grid used for estimation and simulation. We found no evidence at the estimated
parameterization, that the expected value function is not globally concave.
Given a set of parameters and the solution of the female problem at time
t+1, the critical step in the solution at time t is to calculate the optimal level of
consumption (or, equivalently, next period assets) at each possible realization
of the labor supply choice (l). This amounts to solving for the root of the Euler
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equation
ct(Xt; lt) =
(
u′l
)−1(
βRE
[
u′
(
ct+1(Xt+1)
)|Xt lt])(16)
= (u′l)−1
(
βR
∑
lt+1=OPF
Prob(lt+1|Xt lt)
× E[u′(ct+1(Xt+1))
∣∣∣Xt ct lt]
)

where the (u′l)
−1 is the analytical inverse of the utility function with respect to
consumption conditional on labor supply l, and is evaluated at the expected
marginal utility of consumption at t + 1, a function of the state variables at
t + 1. The expectations are conditional on information and choices at t.
A couple of comments are due at this stage. First, for a standard dynamic
problem with continuous choice and a twice continuously differentiable and
concave utility function, the policy function is monotonic in assets and there is
a single solution to the above equation. This can be quickly located by search-
ing for the point in consumption at which the difference between the right-
hand side (r.h.s.) and the left-hand side (l.h.s.) of equation (16) changes sign.
Fella (2014) showed that the monotonicity result extends to dynamic problems
with discrete and continuous choice away from kinks since the value function
is concave between any two consecutive kinks. Hence, there is at most a sin-
gle interior solution within each concave section of the value function, which
needs to be calculated so the global optimum can be determined. While Fig-
ure 12 shows that, in our problem and for the estimated set of parameters, the
expected value function is globally concave—ensuring that condition (16) is
sufficient for an interior optimum—we do check for multiple roots during es-
timation since global concavity may not hold over the entire parameter space.
Second, although our solution approach to the approximation of the opti-
mal consumption function is in the spirit of Carroll’s Endogenous Grid Point
method (Carroll (2006)), we do not follow his strategy of endogenously select-
ing a grid for assets at time t by solving equation (16) backwards having set a
grid for assets at t + 1. Instead, we follow the traditional approach of selecting
a fixed grid in assets at time t and solve for the optimal consumption (or assets
at t+1). This is facilitated by the observation that the r.h.s. of (16) is nearly lin-
ear in assets at t + 1 (or consumption at t) over most of its space. This is shown
in Figure 13. We therefore use linear interpolation to solve the Euler equation
on a grid of assets that is finer towards the lower bound of its domain, where
the problem is more nonlinear.
The following algorithm describes the solution procedure at time t, given the
expected value and marginal utility functions at time t+1. For convenience, we
split the state variables in two sets, depending on whether their realization is
known or not from the viewpoint of the previous period, conditional on choice.
So Xt = (Ωtωt) where Ω= (θx1x2 s at et) is known by the woman at t−1
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FIGURE 13.—Inverse marginal utility applied to the expected marginal utility function; by age,
family demographics, and assets. Notes: Lines are numerical approximations of the functions
at selected age and family demographics by assets. Plots are for women of type I in utility cost
of work, low background factors 1 and 2, with compulsory education only and at their average
productivity level, the age of the youngest child is 10 for mothers, and the spouses of women in
couples have completed compulsory education only and are working at their average productivity.
conditional on choice, and ω = (υtkt tkt mt s˜t l˜t  υ˜) is uncertain. The goal
is to compute the expected value function (EVt) and the expected marginal
utility function evaluated at the optimal choices (Eu′t), where expectations are
taken at t − 1. Ωt is known at t − 1 conditional on the choices at that time, but
ωt is not and needs to be integrated out. Hence, EVt and Eu′t are functions of
(Ωtωt−1).
Inputs. These include:
1. Numerical approximations of the expected value function and the ex-
pected marginal utility of consumption evaluated at the optimal choices at
t + 1. These are functions of (Ωt+1ωt): EVt+1(Ωt+1ωt) and Eu′t+1(Ωt+1ωt).
2. Grids for all predetermined continuous variables at t: assets, experience
(at et).53 The support of the discrete state variables (including the woman’s
53We use a grid of six points in each of the variables (a e). The grid points in assets and
experience are more concentrated towards the bottom of the domain of each variable, where the
problem is more nonlinear.
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family background, education, and preferences for working, whether children
are present and the age of the youngest, whether she faces childcare costs as a
mother of a young child, the presence of a partner, his education and employ-
ment status) is fully represented in the solution.
3. Grids for the random productivity shocks on the wage rates of the woman
and present partner at time t, (υt υ˜t).54 The grid points in the productivity
shocks are the midpoints (median) of the equal probability adjacent intervals
of their entire support and hence the quadrature weights are constant.
Step 1. Approximate the policy function for consumption conditional on la-
bor supply:
For each grid point of female characteristics (family background (x1x2),
preference type θ, education s, working experience e, and productivity level υ),
family demographics (children k, age of youngest child tk, partner m), and
the characteristics of a present partner (education s˜, employment status l˜, and
productivity υ˜):
1. Compute total family resources after taxes and benefits, call it It ;
2. Compute next period experience, et+1;
3. Interpolate Eu′t+1(Ωt+1ωt) at et+1;
4. Compute ct(Xt; lt) that solves equation (16) by linear interpolation of
(u′l)
−1(Eu′t+1(Ωt+1ωt)) at at+1 = It − ct(Xt; lt);
5. Calculate Vt(Xt; lt = l) as in equation (15) by interpolating EVt+1(Ωt+1
ωt) at at+1 = It − ct(Xt; lt).
Step 2. Compute the unconditional optimum:
1. Compute optimal labor supply by selecting the value of l that maximizes
Vt(Xt; l);
2. Store the value function Vt(Xt) and the marginal utility of consumption
evaluated at the optimal choice, u′(Xt).
Step 3. Calculate the expected value and marginal utility functions at time t
as functions of (Ωtωt−1):
1. For each point in the grid of (υt−1 υ˜t−1): integrate Vt(Xt) and u′(Xt) over
the distribution of productivity shocks (υt υ˜t) conditional on (υt−1 υ˜t−1);
2. For each possible family type and spouse’s employment status at t − 1:
integrate the resulting functions over the family transition rule and the em-
ployment probability of a present spouse.
Outputs. Period t expected functions EVt(Ωtωt−1) and Eu′t(Ωtωt−1).
Simulations are based on initial conditions for family background and
parental income observed in the data, together with random draws of the en-
tire profile of unobserved shocks. Given this information, individual optimal
choices are calculated starting from the beginning of active life, age 17, and
moving forward. As for the solution, the optimum is computed at each age in
two steps, first by solving the Euler equation to calculate optimal savings at
54We use a grid of six points in υ˜ and of 12 points in υ to ensure that the domain of uncertainty
in female wages, a key determinant of labor supply, is well covered.
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each labor supply point, then by selecting the labor supply that achieves max-
imum total utility. In doing so, however, the problem must now be evaluated
outside the grid chosen for solution. In practice, this means that the contin-
uation functions need to be interpolated over up to four dimensions: future
assets and experience as before, along with present productivity shocks (for
both spouses if women are married). We do this by linear interpolation.
Estimation. The estimation procedure is implemented in two steps. The first
step estimates all the exogenous parts of the model, including the dynamics of
family formation (marriage, divorce, fertility, male labor supply and earnings,
and the cost of childcare). In addition, two parameters are exogenously set: the
coefficient of risk aversion and the discount rate.
The second step implements an iterative procedure to estimate the prefer-
ences and wages of women within the structural model. In each iteration, we
start by solving the female life-cycle problem for a particular set of the esti-
mating parameters, given the economic environment and the exogenously set
parameters. We then simulate five replications of the life-cycle choices of 3,901
women observed in the data, conditional on observed family background and
parental income. The same sequences of lifetime shocks are used in all iter-
ations of the estimation procedure to avoid changes in the criterion function
due to changes in the random draws. For each woman, we select an observation
window such that the overall simulated sample exactly reproduces the time and
age structure of the observed data. The simulations assume women face up to
four policy regimes over the observation window, representing the main tax
and benefit systems operating during the 1991–2008 period. We used the 1995,
1999, 2002, and 2004 regimes and assumed they operate over the periods prior
to 1996, 1997 to 1999, 2000 to 2002, and 2003 onwards, respectively. Women
into their active life over the entire period will experience all of these regimes
at different stages of their lives. Younger and older women, who either enter
or leave active life within our observation window, will experience only some
of these policy regimes during the life period that we are modeling. We assume
that women expect the tax and benefit system they face in each period to be
permanent, so all reforms arrive unexpectedly. Finally, we calculate the simu-
lated moments using the simulated data set and the objective function. We use
248 moments to estimate 89 parameters.
The parameters are selected to minimize the distance between sample
and simulated moments, where the weighting matrix is the inverse variance-
covariance matrix of the data moments as described in equation (13) in the
main text. The procedure described above calculates the value of the crite-
rion function in each iteration of the optimization routine. Given the dis-
crete choice of labor supply, our criterion may not be a smooth function of
the model parameters everywhere in their domain (McFadden (1989)). We
therefore use an optimization routine that does not rely on derivatives. Specif-
ically, we choose to use the Bound Optimization By Quadratic Approximation,
which generates, in each iteration, a quadratic approximation of the criterion
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function that matches the criterion in a set of interpolation points (see Powell
(2009); implementation by Nag).
APPENDIX D: MODEL FIT
Tables XX to XXX display the full list of data moments used in estimation,
together with their simulated counterparts and the normalized (by the data
standard error) differences between the two. The estimation procedure was
based on 248 moments, including education distribution and regressions (Ta-
bles XX and XXI), employment rates (Table XXII), transition rates into and
out of work (Tables XXIII and XXIV), coefficients from log wage regressions,
percentiles of the distribution of log wages and year-to-year changes in wage
rates by past working hours, age, and years of work (Tables XXV to XXIX),
and the probability of positive childcare costs (Table XXX). All moments are
education-specific. Among the 254 simulated moments, 44 fall outside the 95%
confidence interval for the respective data moment, but many amongst these
are very similar to their BHPS counterparts.
TABLE XX
EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education
All 0.248 0.251 0.020 0.108
Low background factor 1 0.411 0.411 0.046 0.000
High background factor 1 0.196 0.199 0.021 0.140
Low background factor 2 0.284 0.295 0.029 0.382
High background factor 2 0.206 0.197 0.027 0.316
High school
All 0.481 0.482 0.023 0.038
Low background factor 1 0.473 0.459 0.047 0.303
High background factor 1 0.484 0.490 0.027 0.217
Low background factor 2 0.524 0.523 0.032 0.025
High background factor 2 0.431 0.433 0.034 0.083
University
All 0.270 0.267 0.021 0.147
Low background factor 1 0.116 0.130 0.031 0.463
High background factor 1 0.320 0.311 0.025 0.352
Low background factor 2 0.192 0.182 0.025 0.409
High background factor 2 0.364 0.369 0.033 0.174
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TABLE XXI
EDUCATION REGRESSIONS
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
High school
Constant 0476 0473 0.034 0.072
Cohort 82+ −0013 −0012 0.055 0.034
Background factor 1 0009 0012 0.020 0.140
Background factor 2 −0042 −0038 0.016 0.236
Cohort 82+ × factor 1 −0010 −0008 0.031 0.059
Cohort 82+ × factor 2 −0005 −0017 0.026 0.426
Log parental income −0010 −0021 0.051 0.222
University
Constant 0192 0198 0.021 0.263
Cohort 82+ 0018 −0014 0.037 0.884
Background factor 1 0076 0077 0.012 0.087
Background factor 2 0067 0071 0.012 0.305
Cohort 82+ × factor 1 0004 −0001 0.024 0.222
Cohort 82+ × factor 2 −0038 0012 0.022 2.200
Log parental income 0118 0119 0.048 0.021
APPENDIX E: MARSHALLIAN ELASTICITIES IN MODELS WITH AND
WITHOUT SAVINGS
In Table XXXI we show the Marshallian elasticities obtained when the
model excludes all savings (except student loans) and compares them to those
obtained by the main model, which allows people to save. The model is re-
estimated by imposing the constraint that consumption is equal to income in
each period.
APPENDIX F: TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS
Here we provide a brief description of the U.K. tax and transfer system.55 We
focus on reforms between four systems—April 1995, April 1999, April 2002,
and April 2004—that represent four different regimes in terms of the generos-
ity and structure of taxes and transfers. These systems are the ones we use in
estimation.
Table XXXII sets out the most important tax rates and thresholds for the
two main personal taxes on earnings: income tax and National Insurance. Both
are individual-based and operate through a system of tax-free allowances and
income bands that are subject to different rates of tax.
Between April 1995 and April 1999, the main income tax and National In-
surance reforms were as follows. For income tax, the personal allowance and
55For a more comprehensive discussion of U.K. taxes and transfers, see Browne and Roantree
(2012) and Browne and Hood (2012).
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TABLE XXII
EMPLOYMENT BY EDUCATION
Secondary High School University
Moment Data Sim SE Data SE Diff Data Sim SE Data SE Diff Data Sim SE Data SE Diff
All employment
All 0721 0705 0011 1475 0825 0817 0011 0782 0870 0863 0014 0456
Single women, no child 0914 0885 0012 2515 0911 0938 0012 2247 0939 0950 0011 1037
Married women, no child 0885 0887 0013 0179 0950 0937 0008 1600 0948 0942 0010 0552
Lone mothers 0452 0432 0031 0654 0672 0650 0046 0473 0858 0761 0056 1729
Married mothers 0639 0637 0016 0122 0722 0717 0018 0283 0770 0764 0029 0197
Partner working 0759 0751 0012 0710 0823 0825 0013 0203 0848 0854 0019 0322
Youngest child 0–2 0415 0403 0020 0590 0595 0560 0026 1375 0701 0680 0034 0598
Youngest child 3–5 0525 0534 0022 0422 0709 0676 0025 1282 0735 0764 0041 0706
Youngest child 6–10 0708 0690 0020 0899 0774 0792 0024 0718 0862 0833 0031 0930
Youngest child 11+ 0805 0781 0019 1292 0854 0869 0024 0612 0895 0865 0039 0758
Family bkg: factor 1 0746 0736 0017 0615 0819 0829 0014 0716 0870 0875 0015 0323
Family bkg: factor 2 0713 0721 0017 0477 0824 0820 0015 0235 0867 0861 0020 0311
Before-after (1999) difference 0028 0018 0010 0960 0014 0017 0008 0368 0025 0005 0012 1632
Part-time employment
All 0207 0199 0009 0906 0159 0158 0010 0112 0123 0122 0012 0071
Single women, no child 0055 0046 0011 0857 0053 0033 0009 2335 0040 0033 0012 0518
Married women, no child 0125 0117 0013 0660 0059 0053 0010 0541 0034 0039 0008 0612
Lone mothers 0181 0177 0023 0193 0167 0159 0032 0229 0097 0088 0037 0250
Married mothers 0298 0287 0013 0870 0279 0282 0017 0160 0243 0240 0025 0107
Partner working 0248 0236 0011 1093 0190 0197 0012 0508 0148 0155 0016 0414
Youngest child 0–2 0219 0220 0015 0096 0256 0257 0020 0064 0241 0243 0028 0059
Youngest child 3–5 0301 0284 0020 0864 0317 0292 0026 0927 0256 0254 0036 0044
Youngest child 6–10 0332 0329 0020 0168 0284 0307 0025 0914 0235 0226 0041 0215
Youngest child 11+ 0273 0231 0022 1898 0192 0183 0027 0332 0170 0156 0044 0330
Family bkg: factor 1 0170 0173 0013 0216 0152 0143 0012 0793 0127 0114 0014 0937
family bkg: factor 2 0203 0195 0013 0592 0172 0146 0014 1913 0112 0117 0015 0358
Before-after (1999) difference −0020 −0003 0009 2024 −0013 0001 0008 1646 0001 −0002 0011 0236
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TABLE XXIII
TRANSITION RATES FROM OUT OF WORK INTO WORK
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education
All 0.180 0.210 0.009 3.194
Women with no children 0.272 0.321 0.036 1.339
Lone mothers 0.114 0.133 0.016 1.223
Married mothers 0.183 0.209 0.011 2.226
High school
All 0.255 0.236 0.016 1.132
Women with no children 0.503 0.333 0.050 3.409
Lone mothers 0.186 0.189 0.037 0.084
Married mothers 0.210 0.224 0.017 0.814
University
All 0.276 0.221 0.031 1.771
Women with no children 0.585 0.326 0.059 4.381
Lone mothers 0.294 0.167 0.082 1.545
Married mothers 0.188 0.191 0.029 0.120
basic rate limit rose in real terms by 11% and 4%, respectively. The starting
rate was cut from 20% to 10%, but the starting rate limit reduced substantially
(58%). Also, the basic rate was cut from 25% to 23%. For National Insurance,
the 2% “entry fee” (cliff edge) payable as soon as earnings exceeded the lower
earnings limit was abolished.
Between April 1999 and April 2002, the basic rate of income tax was fur-
ther reduced from 23% to 22% and the additional allowance for couples was
abolished. In addition, in National Insurance, the lower earnings limit/primary
threshold and upper earnings limit rose by 27% and 10%, respectively.
Between April 2002 and April 2004, the income tax personal allowance and
National Insurance primary threshold both declined by 3% in real terms. Also,
in National Insurance, the main rate and the rate above upper earnings limit
both rose by 1%.
The system of transfers in the U.K. is more complex. Most transfers are
strongly contingent on family circumstances and are means-tested at the family
level. The main transfer programs for working-age individuals in existence at
some point across the four systems of interest are as follows. Child Benefit
is a universal (non-means-tested) benefit available for families with children.
Income Support (together with Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance) is an
out-of-work means-tested benefit that tops net family income up to a specified
level based on family needs. Children’s Tax Credit is a tax rebate available
to families with children. (It is actually part of the tax system but is included
here because of the way it was reformed, discussed below.) Family Credit and
Working Families’ Tax Credit are means-tested benefits for working families
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TABLE XXIV
MEAN TRANSITION RATES FROM EMPLOYMENT TO OUT OF WORK
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education
All 0.064 0.071 0.004 1.914
Women with no children 0.032 0.042 0.004 2.552
Lone mothers 0.146 0.164 0.019 0.920
Married mothers 0.085 0.085 0.006 0.137
Past wage in bottom decile (wt−1 <Q10) 0.111 0.121 0.011 0.903
wt−1 <Q50 0.072 0.083 0.005 2.205
wt−1 <Q90 0.063 0.072 0.004 2.420
High school
All 0.056 0.052 0.004 1.027
Women with no children 0.030 0.025 0.004 1.538
Lone mothers 0.092 0.103 0.019 0.574
Married mothers 0.086 0.078 0.008 0.999
wt−1 <Q10 0.135 0.111 0.018 1.397
wt−1 <Q50 0.079 0.074 0.007 0.730
wt−1 <Q90 0.056 0.055 0.004 0.089
University
All 0.040 0.035 0.005 0.995
Women with no children 0.026 0.020 0.005 1.202
Lone mothers 0.037 0.072 0.022 1.598
Married mothers 0.061 0.056 0.009 0.500
wt−1 <Q10 0.077 0.114 0.036 1.004
wt−1 <Q50 0.079 0.071 0.014 0.590
wt−1 <Q90 0.044 0.043 0.006 0.213
with children. They are structurally very similar to each other. Working Tax
Credit is a means-tested benefit for working families that is more generous for
families with children but also available to childless families. Child Tax Credit
is a means-tested benefit for families with children that is not contingent on
working. Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit are subject to a joint taper.
Finally, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefits are means-tested benefits
that help low-income families meet, respectively, rent payments and council
tax bills.
Table XXXIII sets out maximum entitlements and taper rates for transfers
that were reformed across our four systems of interest. It considers six example
low-wage family types to demonstrate who were the main gainers and losers
from each reform. Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit are not included
because changes to these transfer programs were relatively minor.
Between April 1995 and April 1999, the main change was the abolition of the
lone parent rate of Child Benefit, affecting lone parents. There were also some
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TABLE XXV
LOG WAGES (lnw) AT ENTRANCE IN WORKING LIFEa
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education
Mean 1.806 1.764 0.019 2.153
Variance 0.072 0.077 0.007 0.694
Mean: high factor 1 1.840 1.764 0.023 3.298
Mean: high factor 2 1.823 1.767 0.033 1.733
Wage: bottom quartile (wt <Q25) 0.249 0.271 0.031 0.715
wt <Q50 0.503 0.585 0.037 2.237
wt <Q75 0.751 0.782 0.031 1.008
High school
Mean 1.825 1.862 0.018 2.023
Variance 0.094 0.110 0.007 2.401
Mean: high factor 1 1.825 1.875 0.022 2.321
Mean: high factor 2 1.816 1.889 0.030 2.410
Wage: bottom quartile (wt <Q25) 0.250 0.213 0.025 1.480
wt <Q50 0.500 0.456 0.029 1.506
wt <Q75 0.750 0.704 0.026 1.783
University
Mean 2.095 2.068 0.025 1.039
Variance 0.118 0.128 0.011 0.884
Mean: high factor 1 2.088 2.059 0.027 1.091
Mean: high factor 2 2.121 2.049 0.034 2.123
Wage: bottom quartile (wt <Q25) 0.247 0.290 0.032 1.351
wt <Q50 0.500 0.492 0.038 0.226
wt <Q75 0.753 0.775 0.032 0.685
aStatistics in this table are for 19- to 22-year-old women in the two lowest education levels, or 22- to 25-year-old
university graduates.
modest increases in generosity in Family Credit across all low-wage families
with children.
Between April 1999 and April 2002, Family Credit was replaced by the con-
siderably more generous Working Families’ Tax Credit, affecting working fami-
lies with children. The increase in generosity was particularly large for families
with childcare costs. For example, maximum entitlement for a lone parent with
one child aged 4 and no childcare costs grew by 21% compared with 93% for
the same lone parent but with childcare costs of £98.80 (38 hours at £2.60 per
hour). This is because Family Credit included a childcare income disregard,
whereas Working Families’ Tax Credit had a childcare element that contributed
to the maximum award.
Between April 2002 and April 2004, Child Tax Credit replaced Children’s
Tax Credit and child elements of other benefits included in Working Families’
Tax Credit. This also coincided with a modest increase in generosity. In addi-
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TABLE XXVI
LOG WAGE (lnw) REGRESSIONS ON CUMULATED EXPERIENCE AND LAGGED WAGES
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education
Constant 0433 0444 0039 0290
Family bkg: factor 1 0029 0029 0007 0116
Family bkg: factor 2 −0006 0001 0007 1067
lnwt−1 0745 0742 0015 0186
Log cumulated working years 0073 0145 0073 0986
Lagged log cumulated working years −0040 −0117 0064 1212
Variance of residuals 0050 0053 0002 1294
First order autocorrelation of residuals −0010 −0010 0001 0389
High school
Constant 0374 0345 0032 0907
Family bkg: factor 1 0010 0011 0007 0155
Family bkg: factor 2 0002 0008 0006 0946
lnw 0799 0810 0011 1006
Log cumulated working years 0188 0191 0059 0062
Lagged log cumulated working years −0151 −0162 0050 0225
Variance of residuals 0050 0053 0002 1401
First order autocorrelation of residuals −0010 −0010 0001 0570
University
Constant 0606 0565 0056 0736
Family bkg: factor 1 −0009 0006 0011 1429
Family bkg: factor 2 0001 −0006 0009 0722
lnwt−1 0760 0754 0020 0340
Log cumulated working years 0088 0185 0066 1461
Lagged log cumulated working years −0069 −0156 0056 1561
Variance of residuals 0043 0046 0002 1162
First order autocorrelation of residuals −0007 −0008 0001 0914
tion, Working Tax Credit replaced Working Families’ Tax Credit and extended
entitlement to families without children.
Differences in eligibility and interactions across transfer programs make it
hard to use Table XXXIII to deduce the size of the overall gain or loss across
years. Therefore, Table XXXIV sets out the net family income for the same six
low-wage family types across the four tax and transfer systems. In each case,
results are shown for three different hours of work: zero, part-time (18 hours
per week), and full-time (38 hours per week). In each case, the wage is assumed
to be equal to the April 2004 minimum wage, uprated for inflation. In cases
involving childcare costs, childcare is assumed to be required to cover every
hour of work at a rate of £2.60 per hour. A partner, if present, is assumed to
work 40 hours per week, also at the April 2004 minimum wage.
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TABLE XXVII
LOG WAGE (lnw) REGRESSIONS ON AGE
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education
Constant 1819 1818 0.035 0.038
Family bkg: factor 1 0090 0079 0.019 0.597
Family bkg: factor 2 −0020 0003 0.019 1.204
Age 0051 0049 0.008 0.249
High school
Constant 1721 1834 0.042 2.694
Family bkg: factor 1 0052 0043 0.023 0.366
Family bkg: factor 2 0016 0026 0.021 0.497
Age 0149 0110 0.011 3.669
University
Constant 2078 2072 0.074 0.079
Family bkg: factor 1 −0022 0009 0.036 0.881
Family bkg: factor 2 −0010 −0034 0.028 0.859
Age 0145 0144 0.017 0.036
Childless singles and childless couples were largely unaffected by the re-
forms, except for the changes between April 2002 and April 2004. Childless
singles working full-time and childless couples with one working partner saw
substantial increases in generosity (9% and 23%, respectively). This was due to
the Working Tax Credit reforms, which extended entitlement to families with-
out children.
Lone parents with no childcare costs saw the largest gains between April
1999 and April 2002, particularly if they worked full-time. This is a conse-
quence of the Working Families’ Tax Credit reform. There were smaller gains
across all hours of work between April 2002 and April 2004, due to the Work-
ing Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit reforms. Lone parents with childcare costs
were affected in much the same way, though many of the gains were larger.
There was also an increase in generosity for full-time work between April 1995
and April 1999.
Turning to couple parents, the patterns are similar: the biggest gains were
felt between April 1999 and April 2002, coinciding with the Working Families’
Tax Credit reform. There were also gains between April 1995 and April 1999
particularly for full-time workers and between April 2002 and April 2004 for
part- and full-time workers.
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TABLE XXVIII
DISTRIBUTION OF LOG WAGES DURING WORKING LIFE
Secondary High School University
Moment Data Sim SE Data SE Diff Data Sim SE Data SE Diff Data Sim SE Data SE Diff
Full-time workers
Mean 2.084 2.065 0.011 1.757 2.298 2.280 0.011 1.666 2.555 2.575 0.014 1.433
Wage: bottom dec (wt <Q10) 0.100 0.125 0.006 4.460 0.100 0.111 0.006 1.886 0.100 0.088 0.009 1.310
wt <Q25 0.250 0.254 0.010 0.340 0.250 0.274 0.011 2.312 0.250 0.239 0.014 0.816
wt <Q50 0.500 0.508 0.014 0.600 0.500 0.524 0.013 1.840 0.500 0.490 0.018 0.570
wt <Q75 0.750 0.760 0.013 0.736 0.750 0.766 0.012 1.322 0.750 0.747 0.015 0.232
wt <Q90 0.900 0.910 0.009 1.085 0.900 0.899 0.008 0.187 0.900 0.881 0.010 2.018
Part-time workers
Mean 1.902 1.905 0.011 0.341 2.089 2.104 0.020 0.796 2.474 2.408 0.038 1.726
yt < Q10 0.100 0.113 0.007 1.954 0.100 0.062 0.010 3.879 0.099 0.028 0.019 3.684
wt <Q25 0.250 0.229 0.012 1.774 0.250 0.177 0.017 4.348 0.250 0.224 0.033 0.801
wt <Q50 0.500 0.408 0.016 5.873 0.500 0.435 0.023 2.862 0.500 0.656 0.039 4.021
wt <Q75 0.750 0.719 0.014 2.184 0.750 0.764 0.020 0.667 0.750 0.890 0.035 3.957
wt <Q90 0.900 0.934 0.010 3.496 0.900 0.954 0.013 4.047 0.901 0.973 0.025 2.865
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TABLE XXIX
OTHER MOMENTS IN LOG WAGESa
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Mean earnings by family background
Secondary education, high factor 1 2073 2069 0014 0261
Secondary education, high factor 2 2020 2018 0013 0152
High school, high factor 1 2251 2247 0014 0315
High school, high factor 2 2278 2272 0015 0373
University, high factor 1 2525 2539 0015 0910
University, high factor 2 2530 2543 0018 0748
Coefficients from regression of log wages on log
experience, first differences
Secondary education 0111 0166 0021 2602
High school 0197 0226 0016 1810
University 0230 0267 0021 1743
Mean yearly change in log wages if working
full-time at t − 1
Secondary education 0024 0016 0002 3603
High school 0036 0022 0002 5725
University 0040 0028 0003 3869
Mean yearly change in log wages if working part-time
time at t − 1
Secondary education −0003 0012 0005 3042
High school −0011 0013 0006 3767
University 0011 0014 0011 0255
Mean yearly change in log wages if not working at t−1
Secondary education 0001 −0002 0010 0349
High school −0003 −0002 0012 0047
University −0019 0001 0023 0908
aExperience in the second panel from top is number of years worked in the past.
TABLE XXX
POSITIVE CHILDCARE COSTS AMONG WORKING MOTHERS OF
CHILDREN 10 OR YOUNGER
Moment Data Simulated SE Data No. SE Diff
Secondary education 0.250 0.325 0.014 5.262
High school 0.396 0.403 0.017 0.355
University 0.631 0.462 0.025 6.760
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TABLE XXXI
MARSHALLIAN ELASTICITIES OF LABOR SUPPLY—MODEL WITH AND WITHOUT SAVINGS
Model With Savings Model Without Savings
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
All women 0.475 0.210 0.587 0.254
By family composition
Single women with no children 0.419 0.055 0.304 0.199
Lone mothers 1.362 0.378 2.315 0.374
Women in couples, no children 0.220 0.167 0.266 0.200
Women in couples with children 0.553 0.304 0.641 0.309
TABLE XXXII
TAX RATES AND THRESHOLDS UNDER DIFFERENT TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEMSa
April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Income Tax
Personal allowance 95.45 105.87 105.97 103.09
Allowance for couples 6.99 4.81 0.00 0.00
Starting rate 20% 10% 10% 10%
Starting rate limit 86.65 36.63 44.09 43.89
Basic rate 25% 23% 22% 22%
Basic rate limit 657.99 683.83 686.6 682.21
Higher rate 40% 40% 40% 40%
National Insurance
Lower earnings limit/primary threshold 81.67 83.82 106.27 102.81
Entry fee 2% 0% 0% 0%
Main rate 10% 10% 10% 11%
Upper earnings limit 619.54 634.99 698.54 689.17
Rate above upper earnings limit 0% 0% 0% 1%
aAmounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Allowance for couples is the
married couple allowance and additional personal allowance.
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TABLE XXXIII
MAXIMUM ENTITLEMENTS AND TAPER RATES FOR EXAMPLE FAMILIES FOR SELECTED
BENEFITS AND TAX CREDITS UNDER DIFFERENT TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEMSa
April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Childless single
Child benefit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income support 65.47 65.28 64.42 62.87
Children’s tax credit – – 0.00 –
Tax credits 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.02
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
Child benefit 23.51 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 109.69 108.58 122.04 62.87
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 117.14 162.84
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
Child benefit 23.51 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 109.69 108.58 122.04 62.87
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 186.30 232.00
Childless couple
Child benefit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s tax credit – – 0.00 –
Tax credits 0.00 0.00 0.00 115.69
(Continues)
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TABLE XXXIII—Continued
April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
Child benefit 14.64 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 117.14 162.84
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
Child benefit 14.64 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 186.30 232.00
Taper rates (all family types)
Income support 100% 100% 100% 100%
Children’s tax credit – – 6.67% –
Tax credits 70% 70% 55% 37%
aAmounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Amounts ignore disability-
related supplements and transition rules. Note that it does not make sense to sum across maximum entitlements for
all benefits and tax credits because some cannot be received together. April 1995 child benefit amount includes one
parent benefit (later combined with child benefit). Income support calculated assuming adults are aged 25+. Child-
related components of income support became part of tax credits in April 2004 system. Couples are not entitled
to income support because the partner is assumed to be working full-time. The children’s tax credit is an income
tax rebate so is only received if income tax is paid. It became part of tax credits in the April 2004 system. Tax credits
include family credit, working families’ tax credit, working tax credit, and child tax credit. Tax credit maximum amounts
calculated assuming entitlement to full-time premium and, where relevant, childcare support for 38 hours per week
at £2.60 per hour. Tax credit maximum amount in April 1995 includes full-time premium that was introduced in July
1995. The way childcare was treated for tax credits changed between the April 1999 and April 2002 systems so the
maximum tax credit awards are not directly comparable before and after these dates. Tax credits under the April 2004
system additionally incorporate child-related support previously delivered through income support and the children’s
tax credit. The 37% tax credit taper rate in April 2004 is roughly equivalent to the 55% taper rate in April 2002
because the former operates against gross income and the latter against net income. Also note that under the April
2004 system there was a second taper of 6.67%.
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TABLE XXXIV
NET INCOME FOR EXAMPLE FAMILIES UNDER DIFFERENT TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEMSa
Hours of Work April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Childless single
0 (not working) 65.47 65.28 64.42 62.87
18 (part-time) 85.62 86.92 87.29 86.91
38 (full-time) 148.16 152.51 154.01 167.15
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
0 (not working) 109.69 108.58 122.04 128.66
18 (part-time) 184.32 181.28 201.22 213.83
38 (full-time) 227.14 223.61 263.65 266.51
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
0 (not working) 109.69 108.58 122.04 128.66
18 (part-time) 191.96 190.64 236.78 249.39
38 (full-time) 267.80 275.35 332.81 337.14
Childless couple
0 (not working) 162.49 165.87 164.62 202.47
18 (part-time) 246.60 250.08 246.90 255.17
38 (full-time) 318.01 326.27 325.99 319.20
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
0 (not working) 219.49 226.55 263.60 268.25
18 (part-time) 261.24 268.36 302.41 320.96
38 (full-time) 332.65 344.55 356.95 360.52
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
0 (not working) 219.49 226.55 263.60 268.25
18 (part-time) 276.39 283.58 335.17 353.72
38 (full-time) 332.65 344.55 407.16 429.68
aNotes: Amounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Amounts ignore
disability-related supplements and transition rules. Calculated assuming a wage equal to the April 2004 minimum
wage uprated in line with RPI. A partner, if present, is assumed to work 40 hours per week at the April 2004 minimum
wage. Childcare costs calculated as £2.60 per hour for the number of hours worked listed in the table.
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